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Reform of the United States Tax
Treatment of Income from Cross
Border Trade and Investment
Robert H. Dilworth*
The President's Economic Recovery Advisory Board ("PERAB") has
as part of its mandated inquiry the reform of the U.S. tax treatment of
income from cross border trade and investment. This paper sets forth a
short set of recommendations as to tax reform methodology and some
substantive proposals.' Tax reform should not "start over," or undertake
significant changes, without a fairly detailed understanding of what the
present regime actually does, or does not do, and identifying the
relationship (if any) between the various existing provisions and whatever
"the problem" is perceived to be. The present architecture results from the
* Robert H. Dilworth has practiced in the field of cross border business law since 1966,
both within and without the United States; and for 25 years he has concentrated on the
taxation of income from cross border trade and direct investment. His clients have included
large U.S. and foreign multinational corporations, "mid-cap" corporations and even some
human beings. He served (2005-2007) as Senior Advisor to the Assistant Secretary of the
Treasury for Tax Policy. This commentary is based upon a letter first delivered to Dr.
Austan D. Goolsbee, Chief Economist of the President's Economic Recovery Advisory
Board ("PERAB") on October 13, 2009, in response to the request by PERAB for
recommendations on tax reform by interested citizens. The views expressed herein are his
own. They do not represent the view of the United States government or any of its agencies,
nor of any firms with which he has been affiliated since 1966, nor of any clients of any such
firms.
1 In August 2010, after this article had been submitted for publication, the President's
Economic Recovery Advisory Board issued its "Report on Tax Options." The Report
consisted of a brief description of alternative approaches and options rather than
recommendations as to how best to integrate the competing aspirations of our society with
respect to global business activity. The National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and
Reform is addressing the same issues, with the assistance of many of the same tax policy
advisers who advised the PERAB. The Fiscal Commission report with its recommendations
is scheduled to be issued on or before December 1, 2010. The recommendations in this
article may be useful to the Fiscal Commission in its deliberations.
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striking of balances and the making of compromises between competing
good ideas (and no doubt a few bad ones).
The discussion of international tax reform sometimes suffers from an
acute information gap. For example, the "deferral privilege" is routinely
described as a subsidy for foreign direct investment, and a subsidy that
leads to job migration out of the United States. The description is routinely
uttered by experts with apparently little or even no involvement or exposure
to the decision making process actually followed by businesses that make
the decisions.
If job migration out of the United States is an important concern for
the PERAB, the PERAB should first try to ascertain why investment-
location decision makers make the decisions they do with respect to direct
investment. The notion that tax motivation is the dominant consideration,
and that real business factors only "may" also form part of the decision
making process, is simply wrong.
As stated before the Senate Finance Committee at a hearing in June
2008, I have never met a business decision maker (who was actually a
decision maker about where to locate a business that actually employs
people) who would agree that his multi-national company (MNC) employer
acted to invest somewhere because of an interest free loan of residual U.S.
corporate tax if the company invested in a foreign country rather than the
United States. Although such anecdotal evidence may be suspect, the Tax
Reform Subcommittee might find it profitable to meet with business
decision makers to determine the extent to which they think investment
location decisions are made based on deferral of residual U.S. corporate tax
compared to factors such as labor costs, environmental and other non-tax
regulations, proximity to customers, access to materials and components,
educated work force, and domestic tranquility. If there is a variance
between the reasons business decision makers think they make decisions
and the algorithms on which the deferral-subsidy thesis is sometimes based,
it might be worth re-examining the simplifying assumptions used in the
algorithms.
The Tax Reform Subcommittee should keep in mind the difference
between the location of direct investment and the location of ownership of
intangible property. Direct investment is often dependent on intangible
property, but ownership-location considerations may be quite different than
investment location considerations.
The Tax Reform Subcommittee should also seek to measure the extent
to which financial accounting for deferred U.S. tax may affect, or perhaps
even distort, business decision making. There appears to be an asymmetry
under GAAP between FAS 942 (including foreign subsidiary earnings in
2 Consolidation of All Majority-Owned Subsidiaries, Statement of Fin. Accounting
Standards No. 94 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1987), available at
http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fas94.pdf.
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consolidated earnings based on availability of such earnings to the parent
and to the parent's shareholders) and FAS 1093 (particularly APB 23)
(excluding from the consolidated tax provision any amount of residual U.S.
tax on earnings intended to be indefinitely reinvested by the foreign
subsidiary). As a first step, the Tax Reform Subcommittee should meet
with members of the Financial Accounting Standards Board to determine
the bases for such asymmetry (if there are any). Earnings per share likely
have a much greater impact on investment location decisions than either
"cash on cash taxes" or even an economist's present value calculation of
cash on cash taxes to be paid in the future.
The goal of simplification should not be an overriding consideration.
Simplification is desirable at this stage in the development of the U.S.
international tax regime primarily for two reasons: (1) to enable a
reasonably well-informed citizenry and electorate to understand the rules of
the road, and (2) to minimize the risk that future tax policy makers will act
in ignorance of how the rules actually work and why they work the way
they do. Simplification should not be pursued on the facile notion that
special interests account for the present complexity of the international
provisions of the federal income tax, or that somewhere out there a grand
guiding principle exists comparable to E=mc 2. The international tax
architecture is complicated because we are a complicated national economy
(and society) in a larger universe of a global economy with which we must
come to grips.
The Administration's 2010 and 2011 Budgets propose a "pooling"
approach to the foreign tax credit. All foreign taxes on all distributed and
undistributed foreign subsidiary earnings, and foreign taxes thereon, would
be pooled. A foreign tax credit would be allowed only with respect to the
average rate of foreign tax on the pool. The foreign tax credit would not be
determined on the basis of the actual foreign taxes on the earnings of the
foreign corporation that pays the dividend. Whatever the political or
economic benefits of the proposal, the proposal appears to be in conflict
with each of a large number of bilateral tax treaties. In the end, the issue
may be resolved by consultation with important treaty partners. Any
changes in the framework of our global tax posture need to be vetted with
careful attention to the treaties into which we have encouraged other
countries to enter and to the potential impact on other countries' perception
of the United States as a reliable treaty partner. I do not advocate pacta
Accounting for Income Taxes, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 109
(Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1992), available at http://www.fasb.org/ pdf/fasl09.pdf.
4 Robert H. Dilworth, Proposed Multilateral FTC Pooling and U.S. Bilateral Tax
Treaties, 124 TAx NOTES 1227 (2009). The GAAP references have been changed since
submission of the letter to PERAB by the Financial Accounting Standards Board's adoption
of the Codification of Accounting Standards. The substantive content has not changed,
however. References to particular financial accounting standards have not been changed
herein from the traditional citations.
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sunt servanda, but I do advocate being courteous and diplomatic in
American foreign policy (even in tax matters).
The following suggestions are the points on the lines of choices where
I would strike the balance among competing goals. There is more than one
wrong answer and it is important to keep the importance of all this in
perspective. American business may be injured by bad choices, but it is
unlikely to be brought to its knees. The U.S. job market is unlikely to be
favorably affected by increasing the tax on U.S. MNCs (as proposed in the
Administration's 2010 and 2011 Budget with respect to international
business income), but popular perception that someone is trying to do
something may encourage domestic tranquility even if domestic jobs do not
materialize as a result of a tax penalty on foreign business activity.
RETAIN EXISTING CORE ARCHITECTURE
The United States should tax all business income, domestic or foreign,
derived by businesses with a prescribed minimum nexus to the United
States and should allow a foreign tax credit. Business income would
consist of items realized by a U.S. taxpayer under general U.S. tax accrual
principles.
U.S. tax should not be imposed on a U.S. shareholder's unrealized
income consisting of undistributed foreign business income of foreign
corporations. U.S. tax should be imposed on a U.S. shareholder when it
receives a distribution of such income. This would maintain the general
global division of taxing jurisdiction between source countries (where the
business activity occurs) and the residence countries (where the
shareholder-investors reside). The United States should tax U.S.
shareholders on their pro rata share of undistributed foreign personal
holding company income to the extent attributable to portfolio investment
made by a controlled foreign corporation. A PFIC-type 5 interest charge
should be applied to passive income (undistributed foreign personal holding
company income) attributable to a U.S. shareholder's interest in a non-
controlled foreign corporation (10/50 company), when the income is
included upon distribution to such U.S. shareholder.
The United States should not extend a territorial exemption to any U.S.
shareholder's interest in any income of a foreign corporation. All return-
on-capital investment should eventually be taxable in the hands of the U.S.
taxpayer investor, no later than upon actual or constructive receipt as
determined by general U.S. tax principles.
ELIMINATE SEPARATE REGIMES FOR FOREIGN BUSINESS
CONDUCTED VIA FOREIGN CORPORATIONS VERSUS BRANCHES
5A "PFIC" is a passive foreign investment company as defined in I.R.C. § 1297. Section
1291 imposes an interest charge on the "deferred tax amount" when a distribution is made by
a PFIC (or with respect to certain gains on disposition of an interest in a PFIC).
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AND OTHER PASS-THROUGH ENTITIES
The United States should treat all foreign business activities, in which
a U.S. corporation has more than a ten percent voting equity interest, as a
separate entity (corporation) rather than variously as a corporation, branch,
or other pass-through entity based on the legal form of the business vehicle.
This will eliminate electivity of tax regime for foreign business activities of
U.S. MNCs, particularly loss pass-through and disregarded transactions
between a legal entity and its branch.6
MATCH FOREIGN-RELATED EXPENSES AND FOREIGN-RELATED
INCOME
Existing law should be modified to apply a matching principle for
deductible expenses incurred to produce "foreign-related income." All
"foreign-related income" should, in the aggregate, pay for itself. Expenses
attributable to "foreign-related income," to the extent in excess of aggregate
"foreign-related income," should not offset otherwise taxable domestic
income.
The present law approach should also be extended to matching of
expenses, used for purposes of limiting the maximum foreign tax credit, to
include not only taxpayers that are affected by the foreign tax credit
limitation (based on expense allocations) but also to include taxpayers that
do not have foreign tax credits in any particular year sufficient to have an
economic effect equivalent to matching. Without such matching, expenses
incurred to produce foreign-related income can offset U.S. corporate tax on
the corporation's purely domestic income (if any).
The principal items affected would be interest expense, general and
administrative expense, and research and experimentation expense.
Allocable interest expense should be calculated by taking into account
controlled foreign corporation indebtedness. The class of income to which
such expenses are to be allocated should be drafted broadly (in contrast to
the Administration's 2010 and 2011 Budget Proposals that would match
only expenses and foreign income attributable to dividend-producing
assets).7
A broadly drafted class would consist of all foreign-related income
attributable to cross border business activities, including: (1) undistributed
direct investment income; (2) direct investment dividends, and related party
interest, rents and royalties from direct investment foreign affiliates; (3)
active business royalties from third parties; and (4) export sales income (but
6 See Robert H. Dilworth, Tax Reform: International Tax Issues and Some Proposals, 35
INT'L TAX J. 5, 21-22, 86-87, 92 (2009).
7 The Administration's 2011 Budget Proposal would apply the same principle but would
allocate and apportion only interest expense and would not allocate and apportion general
and administrative expense. The difference is quantitative rather than qualitative.
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see resourcing proposal for export sales and intangible property royalties).
Using a broadly drafted class, deferrable expenses incurred for the
production of a broad class of deferred income would be initially larger, but
would be more readily restored to deductibility if the class includes items
normally remitted currently, such as related party interest and royalties, as
well as other foreign-related items taken into account on a current basis
such as export sales income and royalties for U.S.-origin intangible
property. Direct investment income would include not only distributions on
equity, but also interest, rents and royalties from foreign direct investment
and active foreign business.
Interest and royalties received from foreign-related business would
restore deductions for expenses that might have been incurred to generate
earnings to be derived by dividends not yet taken into income. The core
premise is that if foreign-related business activity pays for itself, on a
current basis, the United States should count its blessings. Any deferred
expenses not restored as deductions in any taxable year would be added to
basis in the U.S. shareholder's investment in assets intended to produce
foreign-related income. If that investment is disposed of, or abandoned, the
tax benefit of deferred and capitalized deductions would be available
subject to any limits on loss deductions generally.
It is likely that no other country applies a comparable matching of
otherwise deductible expense to foreign-related income, even broadly
defined. To this extent, the proposal may decrease "competitiveness" of
U.S. MNCs with similarly situated foreign MNCs. It would be much less
exceptional than matching only against returns on equity.9
TRANSFER PRICING: EXCLUDE RELATED PARTY RISK BASED
ALLOCATIONS OF INCOME TO CFCS, EXCEPT BY TREATY
Section 482 should be amended to exclude allocation of income away
from a U.S. affiliate to a foreign affiliate based on the risk borne by that
foreign affiliate's capital. Such risk-based allocations under bilateral tax
treaties should be retained (in order to maintain appropriate apportionment
of taxing jurisdiction between the source country and the shareholder
investor's residence country). The affiliate's capital that bears the risk
represents the related shareholder's "risk" as the provider of the capital that
8 If this matching proposal were to be adopted, the United States should repeal foreign
base company sales income and foreign base company services income provisions now in
Subpart F. Dilworth, Tax Reform, supra note 6, at 26-39, 93. Further, the United States
should retain the Related Party Look-Through Rule that excludes from Subpart F income
related party interest, rents and royalties paid by foreign affiliates to other foreign affiliates.
This would recognize that cross border business is, more often than not, conducted across
national boundaries. It would update the U.S. tax view to take into account the emergence of
the European Union and the North American Free Trade Agreement in the years since
enactment of Subpart F in 1962. Id. at 5, 15-16, 86-87, 94.
9 Id. at 46-54, 57-60, 92-93.
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bears the risk. This proposal would require adjustment to accommodate
any significant cross border trade and investment by U.S. MNCs in
countries with which the United States does not have treaties, such as
Argentina, Brazil, Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, and the Persian Gulf
states. Such countries could be identified by an appropriate euphemism for
non-tax-havens. 10
ELIMINATE REPATRIATION TAX ON ARM'S LENGTH
TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN A CFC AND U.S. AFFILIATES
Some proponents of ending deferral base the suggestion on the
existence of a tax barrier to repatriation of deferred income. The tax barrier
is the residual U.S. tax on the amount to be repatriated. Ending deferral to
solve this problem is reminiscent of Jonathan Swift's proposed solution to
the famine in Ireland. If the so-called "repatriation tax" is a real problem, it
can be solved without completely repealing deferral and without completely
exempting a piece of such income.
The more measured step would be to repeal section 956 (Investment in
United States property). If section 956 were to be repealed, the kind of
taxable deemed-distributions that would end deferral would be limited to
transactions on non-arm's length terms that would be treated as constructive
dividends under general tax principles. CFC acquisition of related party
stock or debt should be treated as a dividend, or not a dividend, under
generally applicable tax rules rather than pursuant to a special rule for
controlled foreign corporations only. Forcing external leverage is probably
less sensible in 2009 than before the current financial crisis."
RETAIN CREDITING OF FOREIGN TAXES AGAINST U.S. TAX ON
EXPORT SALES INCOME (FOREIGN-RELATED INCOME)
Section 863(b) (deemed foreign source rule with respect to export
sales) should be retained. Such income is foreign-related without regard to
the passage of title, and foreign income taxes on some parts of the overall
pool of foreign-related income should be allowed as a credit against U.S.
corporate income tax on the overall pool.12
MAKE INTANGIBLE PROPERTY ROYALTY SOURCING
SYMMETRICAL WITH INCOME FROM EXPORT SALE OF
INVENTORY PROPERTY, EXCEPT TO THE EXTENT OTHERWISE
PROVIDED BY TREATY
All things being equal, there should be no distinction in treatment as
"foreign-related income" of any income derived from an intangible when it
1o Id..at 68-73, 94.
" Id. at 39-46, 94-95.
12 Id. at 63-65, 95.
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is licensed rather than embedded in exported tangible property. If a careful
examination (in which MNC decision makers are at least consulted)
confirms that research and development activities will not be likely to
migrate as a result of such a change, symmetry with export property
sourcing would be a desirable result. Such examination should consider the
extent to which alternative locations for research and development are, or
are not, parties to tax treaties with the United States. If migration of the
research and development activity is a serious risk, the existing system
should be retained: U.S.-situs research and development is worth more than
symmetry with export sales.13
INTEREST FROM RELATED PARTIES SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE
FOREIGN SOURCE INCOME ELIGIBLE FOR CROSS CREDITING
All interest from foreign enterprises in which the interest recipient (or
any person that controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with
the recipient) is a greater than or is exactly a ten percent shareholder would
be foreign source income against the U.S. tax on which excess foreign taxes
from other foreign direct business investment could be credited. All foreign
source income should also be foreign-related income. 1
CONTRIBUTIONS OF APPRECIATED PROPERTY TO FOREIGN
AFFILIATES SHOULD TRIGGER TAX ON THE VALUE OF PRIOR
DEDUCTIONS AGAINST U.S. TAXABLE INCOME
This recommendation is prompted by two distinct considerations.
First, the treatment of valuation in the case of outbound transfers of income-
producing property in exchange for stock should be symmetrical in
economic consequences with similar transactions when the consideration is
money or other property. Second, simplification gains would be desirable if
available without doing violence to the first consideration.
Income-producing property will often have been purchased or
developed with tax deductible expenditures. If such property is shifted to a
foreign affiliate without recovering the deductions, there would be an
asymmetry between the recommendation that current expenses allocable to
foreign-related income be deferred to the extent they exceed foreign-related
income. At present, the basic approach is to capture the fair market value
when and if an exit tax is due. Although the present system may be
appropriate for some items of property, the search for fair market value of
items that are not normally disposed of in a market is a difficult
" Id. at 65-68, 95.
14 Dilworth, Tax Reform, supra note 6, at 54-57, 60-63, 95. In addition, dividends,
interest, rents and royalties from portfolio investment should be ineligible for cross crediting
any foreign income tax imposed on foreign direct investment income for purposes of the
expense matching proposal. Expenses related to foreign-related business income would not
be eligible to offset foreign-related portfolio income. Id. at 84-85, 95.
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undertaking. Simplification gains could be achieved by seeking to
recapture only prior unrecovered deductions.
In the case of high-value intangible property, expense recapture may
be simpler but it may also be asymmetrical with the valuation approach
suggested for cost sharing in the development of high value intangible
property. In addition, tracking and allocating costs of developing
successful high-value intangible property, and determining how much of
the costs of developing unsuccessful intangible property should be borne by
the successful intangible property, is likely to erode any simplification gains
otherwise available when dealing with property that is unlikely to generate
premium returns.
If, notwithstanding the undesirable complexity inherent in expense
recapture, a regime requiring current recapture of previously deducted costs
is adopted, and if it is also important that there be symmetry between the
treatment of inframarginal (premium returns) on transferred intangible
property transferred for stock and the treatment of such returns by means of
a cost sharing arrangement (with buy-in payments when applicable), the
transfer of intangibles for stock should trigger a recovery of previous
deductions of expense incurred in the development, plus a current return for
the cost of capital previously incurred to develop the property. The
treatment of the value (if any) in excess of the development-cost recovery
could then be treated in a manner consistent with the approach that would
apply in a cost-sharing arrangement. The premium return could be realized
by the U.S. MNC (capital provider) when it realizes a return on capital
investment (dividends) from the transferee controlled foreign corporation.
Alternatively, the premium return could be realized over the life of the
intangible by relying on a deemed running royalty that is commensurate
with income (i.e., comparable to the current law treatment under section
367(d)).
As with the ongoing discussion of cost sharing, tax policy makers
should be very cautious in moving to a regime in which U.S.-situs research
and development is treated less favorably than foreign situs research and
development. The relevant comparison will include foreign situs research
and development by the U.S. MNC as well as foreign or U.S. situs research
and development by a "foreign" MNC. If the same intangible will have a
higher value when owned by a foreign MNC than by a U.S. MNC, there is
always the risk that portfolio investment capital will follow such a
comparative advantage. Today there are 600,000 foreign students in the
United States and 200,000 U.S. students in foreign countries. The
opportunity for ideas and capital to come together outside the United States
should be taken into account. The notion that intellectual property is
inherently American and cannot "get away" is unlikely to be true in the
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JOINT VENTURES (10/50 COMPANIES)
The guiding principle with joint ventures should be to treat direct
investment in controlled foreign corporations the same as direct investment
in non-controlled foreign direct investment (i.e., 10/50 companies). Certain
modifications must be made with respect to portfolio investment income of
a 10/50 company.
Matching
Expenses incurred by a U.S. corporate taxpayer attributable to direct
investments (greater than or exactly ten percent) in non-controlled foreign
corporations should be nondeductible unless and until foreign related
income is included in income by the U.S. shareholder. Any deferred
expense attributable to the joint venture investment would, in effect, be
capitalized and added to basis of the U.S. shareholder's investment.
The amount of allocable interest expense would be the amount of
deferrable interest incurred by the U.S. shareholder allocable to the joint
venture investment. If and to the extent the U.S. shareholder could provide
information to support an adequate measurement of foreign affiliate interest
expense, the amount of U.S. shareholder allocable interest expense could be
reduced in the same manner that U.S. shareholder interest is reduced by
interest expense of a controlled foreign corporation. The excess or net
allocable interests in any year would then be added to the pool of
potentially deductible expenses associated with all foreign-related income.
Foreign Tax Credit
All foreign taxes on foreign source business income would be taken
into account and allowed to offset all U.S. tax otherwise due with respect to
foreign source business income. As with controlled foreign corporations,
deferred expenses, when restored and deductible, would be subject to
limitations comparable to present law that would prevent offsetting foreign
income tax on foreign income against U.S. tax on U.S. income (section
904(d)). There should be no separate "10/50 basket."
Foreign Personal Holding Company Income
U.S. shareholders would not be taxed on undistributed foreign personal
holding company income of a non-controlled foreign corporation. Deferred
expenses associated with the investment in the 10/50 company would be
available as a deduction taxable if and to the extent of foreign-related
income. Deferred expenses would not be "grossed up" (from time incurred
and deferred until restored) by the foregone financial rate of return on
disallowed deductions. The PFIC regime should be retained. If a 10/50
company derives certain minimum proportions of portfolio investment
income, it would be a "PFIC" and shareholders would be subject to an
interest-like charge on the tax then imposed upon receipt of a distribution.
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Relief from the interest charge regime would be available to shareholders
able to make an effective "qualified electing fund" ("QEF") election to be
taxed currently on undistributed income. Absent PFIC treatment, there
would be no special treatment of income derived in respect of a direct
investment in a 10/50 company: all income received by a U.S. shareholder
should be taken into account and taxed when actually or constructively
received under general U.S. tax principles.
Foreign Base Company Sales Income
No special treatment would be necessary with respect to related party
sales and services income. The repeal generally of foreign base company
sales income and foreign base company services income represents a policy
decision that is equally applicable to 10/50 companies.
Foreign Personal Holding Company Exclusion: Look-Through Rules
Should Apply to Interest, Rents, and Royalties
No special rules would be necessary, except to distinguish related
party interest, rents and royalties from portfolio asset income. Such rules
would be relevant with respect to PFIC treatment of a 10/50 company.
Any such items of income received by a foreign corporation from a
payer in which the recipient (or any person that controls, is controlled by, or
is under common control with the recipient), holds more than a ten percent
equity interest, would not be treated as portfolio income."
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES SHOULD
CONTINUE TO BE TAXED ON EFFECTIVELY CONNECTED
INCOME
Branch rules should be replaced by a separate entity rule that would
treat all domestic branches as separate corporations. Interbranch
transactions should be treated as intercompany transactions and related
party royalties for domestic use of foreign-origin intangible property should
be foreign source to the same extent that royalties for use of U.S.-origin
intangible property would be domestic. Further, dividends and interest
from domestic corporations should remain a U.S. source to the same extent
as present law allows and subject to U.S. withholding tax except to the
extent otherwise provided by treaty. This is present law and should not
change under the logic of this proposal.' 6
" Id. at 87-90, 96.
16 Similarly, present law should be retained with regard to foreign portfolio investment in
U.S. business entities. Dividends, interest, rents and royalties should be taxable based on
gross income at appropriate withholding tax rate, subject to treaty relief. Portfolio interest
taxation should eventually be made symmetrical with taxation of dividends paid to
nonresident aliens and foreign corporations. The present regime favors foreign portfolio
debt investment over foreign portfolio equity investment in domestic business enterprises.
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FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
Domestic: Present Law Temporary Exclusion from Subpart F Should Be
Made Permanent
Assuming that Subpart F is amended for industrial and services
corporations as recommended above, U.S.-parented MNCs engaged in the
active conduct of a banking, financing or similar business should be
symmetrically excluded from the regime taxing U.S. shareholders currently
on undistributed foreign personal holding company income (income that is
not otherwise excluded from foreign personal holding income on the basis
of a related party payer). However, any income deferred from tax would
result in a corresponding deferral of deductions for interest, general and
administrative expense and other expenses incurred to produce such
deferred foreign financing business income. Simplifying conventions
should be applied to accommodate differences in currencies and other terms
(maturities, interest rate basis) applicable to borrowing by such financial
institutions and lending by such institutions.
Branches and subsidiaries would be treated as separate entities
(corporations) for this purpose. Interbranch transactions should therefore be
treated as cognizable intercompany transactions.
Foreign Parent Financial Institutions: Domestic Branches Should Be
Treated as Separate Corporations
Foreign-parented MNCs engaged in the active conduct of a banking,
financing or similar business that generates U.S. source income effectively
connected should be subject to corporate tax on net income. Branches
should be treated as separate corporations. Interbranch transactions should
be treated as transactions with tax effect. The Branch Profits tax should be
repealed because a branch would be treated as a separate corporation.
TAX-EXEMPT INVESTORS
Distributions from foreign MNCs should be made a class of unrelated
business taxable income ("UBTI")1 7 (subject to a contrary provision in a
U.S. tax treaty with the country from which a tax-exempt investor receives
a dividend). All income from investments in domestic and foreign
corporations should be taxed once to the extent attributable to a U.S. tax-
exempt investor's interest therein. If a tax-exempt U.S. investor invests in a
foreign corporation that is exempt from U.S. corporate income tax, there
may be a marginal investment incentive to invest uniquely "American"
capital outside the United States. Treaties could provide otherwise, because
17 An organization otherwise exempt from income tax pursuant to I.R.C. § 501(a) is
subject to income tax with respect to its "unrelated business taxable income" ("UBTI") as
defined in I.R.C § 512.
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treaties are generally concluded with countries with a "meaningful" tax
system. 18
BILATERAL VS. MULTILATERAL FOREIGN TAX CREDIT.
If a tax increase on MNCs with multijurisdictional business is thought
necessary, the "pooling basis" proposal should be deferred, and a more
direct limitation of cross crediting should be pursued instead. A
multilateral foreign tax credit regime will not work without a multilateral
consensus among the United States and concerned treaty partners. The
daunting complexity of the 1986 Act "basketing" to eliminate cross
crediting between baskets is, of course, at odds with any simplification
goals, but probably less so than the proposed pooling basis foreign tax
credit proposal. Whatever "solution" is pursued should not be based on
Humpty Dumpty's argument that the words of the treaties mean only what
the Treasury Department wants them to mean at any point in time.
563
18 Dilworth, Tax Reform, supra note 6, at 90-91.
19 Dilworth, Proposed Multilateral FTC Pooling and US. Bilateral Tax Treaties, supra
note 4, at 1233, 1252.
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